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VOLKMAR J. HARTJE*

Oil Pollution Caused by Tanker
Accidents: Liability Versus
Regulation
INTRODUCTION

When economists discuss instruments to control pollution, their attention focuses on taxes, the creation of property rights, and various regu-

latory approaches; they rarely discuss liability, however.' The economic
effects of liability law have been addressed in a variety of other contexts
such as car accidents, products liability, and medical malpractice. 2 Because liability law in general has the function to compensate for damages
caused to individuals, hence serving as a deterrent to the originator of

the damage, and because pollution causes damages to individuals, the
use of liability law for pollution control would be a logical extension of

existing instruments.
The law of torts that governs non-contractual liability has been part of

private law for centuries, but this segment of private law has done very
little to control pollution in the past. This failure primarily stems from
the historical fact that the law of torts was codified in the 19th century

mainly to deal with "legal conflicts in which a single person affected

confronted a single individual tortfeasor." 3 In these conflicts, plaintiffs
easily established causal relationship between the defendant's action and
damage. This conception of the law of torts seems ill-suited for modem
pollution problems where a number of polluters emit a variety of pol-

lutants, affecting major portions of the population in large regions. In
order to establish a claim for compensation, the victim must show injury,
*International Institute for Environment and Society, Science Center Berlin
1. The textbooks in environmental economics focus the instrumental discussion on standards,
taxes, subsidies, and sometimes property rights. Compare, W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); P. NIJKAMP, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1977); D. PEARCE, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
(1976). The survey of Fisher and Peterson, The Environment in Economics: A Survey, 14 J. ECON.
LIT. 1 (1976) does not mention liability as an instrument at all.
2. There are a number of attempts to develop an economic theory of liability in general. See, R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) (particularly Chapter 6), or Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, J.LEGAL STUD. 323-49 (1973). For the applications,
see, G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1973); Reder, An Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 5 J.LEGAL STUD. 267-91 (1976);
and McKean, Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property Rights, 84 Q.J. ECON.
611-26 (1970).
3. Lummert, Changes in Civil Liability Concepts, in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
AND LAW 238 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).
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the identity of the injurer, a causal relationship between the tortious action
and the injury, and negligence, because in most legal systems liability
law is based on fault.4 The victim more easily carries the burden of proof,
and can successfully claim compensation, when wandering cattle damage
neighboring crops than when a number of pollutants cause environmental
disease. Multiple causes for the same disease, a long latency period,
varying levels of exposure, lack of knowledge about effects, and a large
number of tortfeasors, inter alia, confront the victims of air pollution
claiming compensation from any polluter. If the polluter's chances of
avoiding payment of compensation are high, the incentive of liability law
to prevent pollution is low. Hence, the question arises whether all liability
approaches can be ruled ineffective, or whether liability laws can be
developed that make it easier for victims of pollution to claim compensation.
Liability law, court rulings, and compensation show a tendency to
reduce the stringent proof requirements for the victim. Strict liability for
operators of railroads, airplanes, and other public transportation exempts
the victim from the burden of proof of fault. The burden of proof, however, falls on the victim when the defendant is a polluting industrial plant.
In most cases, establishing a causal relationship between the polluter's
behavior and the damage has been very difficult. The decision of Japanese
courts to accept epidemiological evidence for air pollution was considered
5
a break-through.
Identification of the injurer remains a necessary fact to be established.
In the past, the doctrine of contributory negligence usually served as a
legal defense in cases where the pollution could be attributed to more
than one defendant. Where the uncertainties of allocating liability are not
a legal defense, the question becomes one of apportioning damages. If
the compensation payments are continuous and the contributions of each
polluter are based on his emissions, such a compensation scheme would
amount to a court-administered fee system. In Japan, the general air
pollution compensation scheme is financed on this basis as the result of
specific law rather than court decision.' The deterrent effect of the compensation law depends on the criteria used to apportion monetary damages.
In cases where a sole polluter causes pollution-related damage, the
polluter has to pay all the compensation. This will not always be the
case, however, if insurance for compensation becomes relevant. Where
4. Compare, id. at 237-64.
5. R. LUMMERT & K. THIEM, RECHTE DES BURGERS ZUR VERHUTUNG UND ZUM
ERSATZ VON UMWELTSCHADEN (1980), Berichte des Umweltbundesamtes 3/80 at 155.
6. Id. The contributions are based on emissions for large stationary sources and taxes on automobiles.
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one pollutant emitted by only one polluter causes specific damages, the
identification of the polluter is relatively simple. The Minamata and ItaiItai cases are typical examples of easy identification. Oil tanker accidents
are typical of the more difficult cases.
Oil pollution of the oceans has a number of sources other than oil
tankers, which are primarily land-based sources. Although oil pollution
of the seas by tankers constitutes a secondary source, it has attracted a
number of studies by economists. 7 The role of liability for tanker accidents
has been analyzed previously from an economic approach by two of those
authors. 8 Paul Bradley proposes a fine system to address the detection
and enforcement problems for oil spillage control. This approach attempts
to control spillage due to collisions and strandings as well as spills during
transfer operations. The detection of spills is in fact a problem during
transfers, but it is restricted to port areas where detection should not be
too difficult. Detection becomes more of a problem for the discharges of
ballast water and similar sources of oil pollution which take place far
from coasts and harbours. This emission source, however, is operational
and not accident-related. Accidents, such as grounding or collision, are
easily detected, even if they do not result in the break-up of a tanker.
When discussing alternatives, Bradley skeptically reviews the liability
approach. Because of the difficulties of assessing the damages, he doubts
the ability of courts to establish correct damage estimates. Damage assessment, however, is a general problem and is equally relevant to a fine
system, where the agency would have to produce these estimates. The
administration and information costs create major problems for the proposed fine system, particularly if the calculation of fines is based on
individual voyages.
Henry J. McGurren, on the other hand, seems more optimistic about
the ability of the liability approach to control accidental oil pollution. He
seems convinced that strict liability coupled with compulsory liability
insurance "will compel individual shippers to take steps to reduce the
probability of oil pollution damages in the most efficient manner." 9 The
liability approach theoretically has the advantage over a fine system because it fits into the existing legal structure and the insurance industry
7. Burrows, Rowley & Owen, OperationalDumping and the Pollution of the Sea by Oil: An
Evaluation of Preventive Measures, 1 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 202-18 (1974); Bradley,
Marine Oil Spills: A Problem in Environmental Management, 14 NAT. RES. J. 337-59 (1974);
Burrows, Rowley & Owen, The Economics ofAccidental Pollution by Tankers in Costal Waters, 3
J. PUB. ECON. 251-68 (1974); McGurren, The Externalities of a Torrey Canyon Situation: An
Impetus for Change in Legislation, I1NAT. RES. J. 349-72 (1971); and Conrad, Oil Spills: Policies
for Prevention, Recovery and Compensation, 28 PUB. POL'Y. 143-70 (1980).
8. Bradley and McGurren, supra note 7.
9. McGurren, supra note 7, at 364.
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could provide a market-oriented way to determine fines for non-continuous, single-event type pollution through insurance premiums.
THE ECONOMICS OF LIABILITY
Liability laws traditionally provide instruments for resolving conflicts
between different property rights. They constitute the second possibility
in the Coasian analysis of internalizing external effects besides the outright
sale of property rights.' Under this solution, each property owner retains
the rights conferred in him, but is restricted in the use of his rights to
the extent of damages that are to be compensated. In the case of oil
pollution by tanker accidents, the tanker owner has the right to use the
ocean as a transport route without having to get permission from potential
pollution victims, while the potential victims, fishermen or hotel owners,
for instance, do not have to bribe the tanker owner to reduce the accident
risk.
Tanker accidents cause damages to three groups: the shipowner, the
freight owner, and third parties. Without liability laws, the shipowner
would invest in ship safety solely in order to reduce his own damages.
For a rational tanker owner, these investments would be undertaken until
the marginal avoidance costs were equal to the expected marginal damages
to the shipowner. In this situation, the level of safety investment would
be too low from a societal point of view, because his behavior did not
take into account the damages to the freight owner and to third parties.
Liability laws primarily function to compensate those parties who incur
damage. As a consequence, most of the legal reasoning is based on
considerations of fairness. " The economic function of liability law serves
as an incentive to invest in accident avoidance measures to reduce the
expected value of compensation payments. Whether a given liability law
can be considered economically optimal depends on the allocation of
compensation between the parties. Economists use the following criteria:
whether the liability laws minimize and avoid costs. Posner argues that
not only the avoidance costs of the "defendant" but the avoidance costs
of the victim as well are relevant, because both have to be considered as
social costs.' 2 This effect is accomplished through the concept of contributory negligence. Legal scholars and judges justify this type of liability
10. In the Coasian analysis, the externalities that cause conflicts between property rights are the
result of voluntary actions, either compensation payments or the outright transfer of property rights.
With the presence of transaction costs, these voluntary transactions might not take place, thus leaving
the externalities unaccounted for. With liability laws, a procedure for compulsory compensation
exists. See, Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089-128 (1972).
11. Fletscher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537-73 (1972).
12. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 137-38 (2d ed. 1977).
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on fairness arguments. Contributory negligence also serves as an economic incentive for the potential victim to avoid behavior that might
increase the likelihood of damage.
Compensation for negligence is based on the legal standard in unintentional tort cases where "the defendant is guilty of negligence if the
loss caused by the accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident
occuring, exceeds the burden of the precautions that the defendant might
have undertaken to avert it." 3 The avoidance costs are defined as average
costs: the preventive care of a reasonable person. German liability law
defines negligence as not applying the necessary preventive care-not
the usual preventive care.
In tanker accidents, contributory negligence of the victim never arises
as an issue for third party damages, because the victims usually do not
have the means to avoid the accidents and damage. The question then
becomes whether the liability for tanker accidents should be based on
negligence or strict liability. Strict liability means a stronger incentive to
invest in ship safety because lack of negligence would not be a defense.
Certain situations arise, however, when the tanker owner would not be
liable even under strict liability: e.g., in case of war, faulty navigational
aids, and so forth. The question of the efficiency of a given liability law
can be answered only if one compares its outcome with the minimum of
damage and avoidance costs. One major reason for the deviation from
this minimum could be that compensation payments are systematically
lower than damages. This hypothesis is illustrated by the following diagram:
costs
d'

carp,

I
0

,I
ro of accidents

13. Id. at 122 (United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
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The social optimum would occur when marginal damages d' and marginal avoidance costs a' are equal in point a. If compensation payments
are systematically lower than damages, the tanker owner would invest
less in safety, and more accidents would occur (B). Under this scheme,
the compensation payments, and not the damages, are relevant to his
investment decision resulting in a higher number of accidents. Traditionally, national liability laws have resulted in lower compensation payments,
compared to the damages incurred by tanker accidents, for the following
reasons:
* under negligence liability the victims had difficulty proving negligence;
* not all types of damages were compensated for;
* the transaction costs of getting compensation were too high for a
number of victims; and
* the assets of the defendants were too low to cover all claims. If
negligence liability puts the burden of proof on the victims, they
might be hard pressed to establish their case. Decisions in criminal
or admiralty cases, however, may aid sick victims.
A second hindrance to full compensation might be the fact that all
types of damages do not warrant compensation. Usually, personal injury,
property damages, and loss of income, as well as cleaning efforts and
expenditures, are compensable. Damages to ecosystems are not classified
personal, because they are public goods, e.g., nature preserves. The
German civil code provides compensation for private property damages,
including loss of profits, but does not give compensation for injury to
preserves. The relevant specific laws do provide for minimal fines. 4
Estimating the damages for those public goods poses great difficulty, but
it is possible to establish a potential range in which damage amounts
could be determined if compensation were permitted. 5
Damage and compensation divergence due to transaction costs varies
with the location of the court. For Torrey Canyon, where damages had
occured in another country, claim settlement for third party damages began
with the question of the location of the responsible court: in the flag state,
the state of the shipping company, or the state of its holding company.
For victims with small damages, the incentive to claim compensation is
rather small where the cost of placing a claim is high because the court
14. For example, Bundesnaturschutzgesetz (Federal Nature Protection Law) Art. 30, allows for
a fine of DM 30.000.
15. The advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of evaluating eco-systems and thus
damages to them are well established. See, Knetsch & Davis, ComparisonsforMethods ofRecreation
Evaluation, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 450-68 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman, eds.
1977). These methods will provide a range of damages which could overcome the systematic lack
of consideration of these damages in court cases thus far.

January 1984]

OIL POLLUTION CAUSED BY TANKER ACCIDENTS

is located in a different country. If there are a number of these victims,
a high proportion of damages go unclaimed. Moving the responsible court
to the country of damage reduces the transaction costs for a number of
victims. It might increase the defendant's costs, but most likely would
result in a lower total transaction cost and would not alter the behavior
of the defendant.
Another factor which reduces compensation occurs when individual
damage is very small, but the aggregate amount resulting from the injury
is large. The transaction costs of the individual victim might be higher
than the award, even when the court is in his own country, if the claim
for compensation has to be settled on an individual, case by case, basis.
If the transaction costs could be lowered due to economies of scale, the
incentive for the victim to claim compensation might be increased. One
way to gain from economies of scale is to allow class action suits. 16 Not
all countries allow class action suits, and even where they are permitted,
restrictions might prevent maximum economies of scale and reductions
in transaction costs from being fully achieved.
A major obstacle to using traditional liability law as an incentive for
reducing oil pollution damage is the defendant's lack of financial resources
to cover valid compensation claims. Often, the capital of a shipping
company consists only of one ship, owned by a separate corporate entity.
As a consequence of a tanker accident, this capital is lost or its scrap
value too low to cover all compensation. To protect against this loss of
wealth, the owner has an incentive to insure the vessel, but only for the
value of the vessel itself. The cargo owner has a similar incentive, but
again only to the extent of the value of the cargo. While the damaged
third party might try to recover his claim against the vessel owner, recovery from the cargo owner is not possible. Damage that exceeds the
value of the vessel will not be recoverable. Therefore, the vessel owner
has to invest in ship safety beyond the value of the vessel. If one compares
the sales value of a modem tanker, e.g. $40 million, with the damages
in some cases amounting to $200-300 millions, the discrepancies become
obvious. One way to solve this problem is to introduce compulsory liability insurance.
Ideally, compulsory insurance would provide an incentive for the vessel
owner to invest in ship safety. If the insurance premium were proportional
to the marginal risk of damage (likelihood and size of damage), investment
in ship safety would reduce the risk of damage, thereby reducing the
premium until the marginal safety investment cost were equal to the
marginal premiums. This effect, however, is not likely, because of market
16. Backhaus, ForensischeKorrektur von Marktversagen, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY (Berlin 1977).
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imperfections in the insurance industry due to information costs. 17 For
these imperfections, the term "moral hazard" has been coined, although
it does not adequately describe the cause of these imperfections.' 8 To set
the premium proportionate to the individual risk of the insured, an insurance company would have to know before concluding the contract all
factors of the insured that contribute to accidental risk. These include the
quality of the vessel, its navigational equipment, the skill and experience
of its captain and his crew, the mileage of the vessel, its potential routes,
and the "driving" behaviour of the captain.
The same problem occurs with liability insurance for automobiles.
Some of this information is neither too difficult nor too costly to obtain,
but to obtain complete information about the driving behavior of an
automobile owner would imply continuous monitoring of an insured. This
is obviously too costly, so the insurance companies set average rates. In
the automobile insurance industry, the age and experience of the driver,
previous accident record, and size of car are the most important factors
in determining risk. The resulting rates allow the insured to change his
behavior or conceal factors contributing to risk. With average premiums,
a higher likelihood exists that bad risks will be subsidized by good risks,
thereby decreasing the incentive of investing in safety equipment and
driving "defensively" as a means of avoiding accidents. Some insurance
schemes offer lower premiums after years of accident-free driving, to
provide some incentive for reducing risk. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the insured usually has better information about his status as a risk
than does the insurer. This informational asymmetry between the buyers
and the sellers of insurance causes, to a large extent, premiums to have
more of an average than a proportional character, thus creating a market
imperfection.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LIABILITY LAW
The grounding of the Torrey Canyon off the British Coast in 1967 and
the resulting spillage of 10,000 tons of crude oil illustrates the difficulties
in claiming compensation from tanker accidents. 9 The vessel was sailing
under a Liberian flag, with Greek captain and crew, and was chartered
by a British oil company. The ship, however, was registered in the Ber17. Sinn, The Efficiency of InsuranceMarkets, 11 EUR. ECON. REV. 321-41 (1978).
18. The information asymmetry which causes the "moral hazard" is not restricted to insurance
industries. For the general relevance of this asymmetry, see, Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons,"
Quality, Uncertainty,andthe MarketMechanisms, 84Q. J. ECON. 488-500(1970). For the insurance
industry, see, Pauly, Overinsurance and the Public Provision of Insurances: The Role of Moral
Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q. J. ECON. 44-54 (1974), and Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66
AM. ECON. REV. 880-90 (1976).
19. See Burrows, Rowley & Owen, The Economics ofAccidental Pollutionby Tankers in Coastal
Waters, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 259 (1974).
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mudas. The problem of settling the claims was so immense, starting with
finding the appropriate court, that the claims were settled out of court,
with only the British and French governments being compensated for a
part of their clean-up costs. Other claims were left uncompensated.
This unsatisfactory result of national liability law led to new international conventions and agreements, and national laws specifying a new
liability regime for tankers. 2" The Civil Liability Convention and the Fund
Convention changed this legal situation considerably by:
" introducing strict liability
" limiting liability to $17 million per accident
" making liability insurance compulsory
" enumerating specific damages to be compensated
* specifying pollutants
* providing the establishment of a compensation fund up to $36
million per accident.
Before the international conventions became effective law, the tanker
owners established a private liability agreement to compensate for damages up to $17 million per accident (TOVALOP) and a separate private
compensation fund (Christal) covering $30 million per accident. The
international conventions have been ratified subsequently and are now
law, being supplemented in some countries by specific national liability
schemes, the most prominent being the Superfund in the United States.
These agreements and conventions considerably improve the chances of
liability law serving as an instrument to reduce oil pollution by tanker
accidents.
In the light of the previous discussion, a number of questions arise
about whether these changes were adequate. The changes that lowered
the transaction costs for the victims (such as strict liability and location
of the responsible court in damaged country) are part of the improvement.
The limitation of individual tanker owner liability in combination with
the communal compensation funds remains a critical point. The limits of
the liability barely would cover the quantifiable costs of third party damages for the Torrey Canyon ($7.7 million) in 1967. Unlimited liability
with a high minimum compulsory insurance was not introduced because
the insurance industry in 1969 considered the risk uninsurable. This assessment, based on currently marketable premiums, indicated the proposition would be unprofitable. This argument would only have been valid
if the insurance market were so small that coverage of more than $17
20. The Civil Liability Convention was the first convention to be affected in this area by the
Torrey Canyon, together with the Intervention Convention. A presentation of the legal development
in this field can be found in Wood, Toward Compatible InternationalandDomestic Regimes of Civil
Liabilityfor Oil Pollution in Navigable Waters, 5 ENVTL. REP. 50.116-.145 (1975). Here only

those changes in civil liability are presented that bear a direct relationship to the economic reasoning.
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million would place the whole industry in jeopardy. But given the size
of the market, the potential of reinsurance, and the coverage of risks in
existing contracts, these arguments are not convincing. Marketing considerations establish the limits of liability for the insurance industry where
increases in premiums are not desirable. These arguments were in fact
integrated into the Civil Liability Convention, as indicated by the official
records of the proceedings. 2' Nevertheless, through reinsurance, the coverage of the insurer has been raised to $100 million since February 1979,
with no changes in the Civil Liability Convention.22
The arguments against higher or unlimited liability, e.g., the undesirability of increases in premiums, conflict with the goal of liability insurance which is the control of oil pollution by avoidance of tanker
accidents. The increases in premiums for bad risks, i.e., badly maintained
and equipped vessels, over those premiums under traditional national
liability law, are necessary to increase the incentive to invest in ship
safety. Given these increases, the tanker owner has a choice of improving
the vessel and crew standards or scrapping the vessel if improvements
or higher premiums make the continuation of business unprofitable. Both
the selectivity of premium changes and the resulting reaction of tanker
owners are critical to the success of the liability insurance approach. They
are especially desirable from an environmental point of view, because
they eliminate oil pollution risk by scrapping or upgrading tankers.
The existing limits of liability restrict this effect considerably. The
premiums for third party damages will be lower than under unlimited
liability or higher limits. Import fees finance the International Compensation Fund, and sales charges finance the Superfund in the United States,
thereby not discriminating between varying risks of individual tankers.
While they improve the level of compensation, they are not an incentive
to reduce tanker risks.
The question remains, however, whether the situation would improve
if these restrictions were removed and only individual insurance were
available. In this case, the ability of the insurance industry to discriminate
between the individual risks is most important. To move towards a system
of a proportional rate setting, the collection and assessment of more
information relevant to tanker risks would be necessary, as well as a
continuous updating of this information. This system would help to take
into account a number of factors contributing to risks such as ship standards, navigational equipment, and local qualifications. The monitoring
of driving behavior would be prohibitively costly, however, so that this
factor would not be taken into account a priori. Hence, whether pro21. Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), The Records of International
Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage 596-97 (1969).
22. United Kingdom P + I Club Rule 79, Rule 34 (14).

January 1984]

OIL POLLUTION CAUSED BY TANKER ACCIDENTS

portional rate setting is too costly will depend on the number of average
tariff rates and the difference between the actual rate setting system and
the optimal proportional rate structure based on complete information.
An analysis of the present rate-setting practice in the insurance industry
for extreme risks (low probability, high damage) will give some qualitative
results in general, but will never be able to quantify the deviation from
the economic optimum based on perfect information. One observation
can be made from current practices: the assessment improves as the ex
post distribution becomes denser, i.e., as more accidents occur, the ratesetting structure becomes more accurate.
The branch of the insurance industry covering tanker risks raises further
doubts.23 Protection and indemnity (P and I) clubs, mutual associations
with a non-profit character, usually undertake to insure these risks. The
clubs consist of ship owners and charterers, and arose during the 19th
century to cover third party losses such as personal injuries, or pier
damages, that commercial marine insurance was not willing to cover at
that time. Fifteen clubs today cover about 380 million tons. An individual
club covers a certain amount of damage, varying from year to year, with
a maximum of $600,000 in the year 1980. The pool of all clubs covered
up to $3.4 million in 1980, with the excess going to the reinsurance
markets. The premiums, or calls as named by this branch of the insurance
industry, are calculated on an ex-post basis for the entire fleet of an
individual shipowner for all third party risks. For an individual vessel,
ex-ante assessment for oil pollution damages does not take place. This
procedure would be against explicit club policy. Therefore, the clubs do
not collect information about safety equipment of individual vessels, their
overall standards, or hiring practices. The premiums vary between different fleets, because a proper classification by the marine insurance is a
condition for membership; hence, ship standards are taken into account
by the clubs. This procedure does not guarantee safe vessels for two
reasons: (1) the results of classification societies are seldom updated and
(2) P + I clubs do not update this information themselves. As one club
representative explained during a parliamentary inquiry in Britain: "It is
not their job to check on every owner's crewing standards. It would be
impertinent for them to tell, for example, British Petroleum how they
should man and train men for their ships."'24
Given these circumstances, a liability insurance scheme theoretically
and factually cannot provide an optimal level of pollution control. Never23. See Measures to Prevent Collisions and Strandings of Noxious Cargo Carries in Waters Around
the United Kingdom, Second Report from the Expenditure Committee together with the Minutes of
the Evidence taken before the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee in Session 1977-78 and Appendices
(Session 1978-79)(TISC-Report), HMSO 1978, 105-I-rII-Vol. II at 59-103.
24. TISC-Report, supranote 23, at 88.
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theless, the question arises whether the resulting level of pollution control
remains superior to a regulatory approach where governments require
certain safety measures to be undertaken by the ship owner. The argument
in favor of a market-oriented type of pollution control relies on the assumption that this approach improves the efficiency of control because
the polluter can choose the least-costly control technology.
The Cost Effectiveness of Tanker Safety Regulation
Any governmental policy which attempts to decrease the number of
accidents without relying on liability must incorporate a level of pollution
which is considered acceptable as well as instruments to achieve this
policy goal. Economists prefer minimization of damage and avoidance
costs, because they set forth an easily-defined theoretical optimum. (This
optimum is usually presented by a graph similar to that presented at the
beginning of this paper.)
The arguments concerning liability have focused on the fact that compensation payments were systematically lower than damages, which led
to more than the economically optimum number of accidents. A lower
number of accidents, or a zero solution, possibly might be politically
desirable. Economists indicate, however, the combined avoidance and
damage costs will be higher at the politically desirable level of pollution
control in terms of additional resources needed. A textbook presentation
of this concept, which usually depicts the optimum in the middle of the
graph, does not imply the existence of factual information about the two
cost functions. Possibly, damage costs are so high that a zero solution
would be economically optimal.
The translation of this reasoning into a guide to policy making has
been a major asset in environmental economics. Methodological difficulties encountered in studies of damages have caused the economic
definition of environmental quality to be abandoned and replaced with a
political definition. Any attempt at this approach is more difficult for
tanker accidents than for routine air pollution because of the stochastic
nature of this source of discharge. The definition of an environmental
quality goal, e.g., water suitable for swimming, or 'x' tons of BOD
discharge into a river per year, seem to be communicable to politicians
and the general public. The likelihood of accidents, on the other hand,
makes it nearly impossible to arrive at a level of total oil discharge which
is suitable as a goal. Instead, goal definitions, such as "reduce the number
of accidents by 'x'%" or "reduce the maximum outflow per accident to
'x'tons," seem more viable. These goal definitions are closer to instruments of pollution control than the goal of avoiding damage. Damage
avoidance, however, does not exist for this source in practice and can
only be imputed from the instruments used. Instruments availability,
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costs, and effectiveness, are usually analyzed first, and the resulting
improvements are then developed as goals.'
The following examines the existing information concerning the costs
and effectiveness of various instruments for tanker safety to evaluate the
"grand" alternative liability versus governmental regulation. The possible
6
instruments in this context have already been listed and grouped:
A. Prevention of accidents
1) crew training
2) navigational equipment of the vessel
3) traffic safety measures (rules of the road, sea lanes, navigational aids, piloting)
4) ship safety (such as measures to maintain maneuverability,
back-up power, back-up radar, structural stability)
B. Limiting discharges after an accident
1) tank size limitations
2) tanker size limitations
3) increased strength of hull
4) emergency pumping arrangements.
With the exception of tanker size limitations, all of the above instruments
have been incorporated into national or international regulations.
The quality of personnel has been the subject of the Training, Certification, and Watch Keeping Convention of 1978. Traffic safety has been
the topic of the International Conference on Revision of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972, the MARPOL
Agreement of 1973 and various national legislation. Navigational equipment of the vessel and other measures relating to ship safety have been
regulated by the Safety of Life at Sea Convention of 1974 and its 1978
Protocol. Tank size limitations and requirements concerning hull strength
have been a part of the Pollution Prevention Convention of 1973.
Once ratified and rigorously enforced, these control measures surely
will have a positive effect on the tanker accident record. Comparing the
cost effectiveness of these various instruments requires knowledge of the
factors that cause accidents and information about the impact of the
various instruments on these factors. One approach studies the history of
past accidents to determine their causes and to assess the effect of the
various instruments by imputing an average effectiveness of an individual
instrument, e.g., the reliability of a particular piece of navigational equipment. If a certain percentage of accidents occured because one type of
navigational equipment did not exist on board ship, then the requirement
25. See the press declaration of the White House for the Ocean Pollution Policy of President
Carter: "It is the goal of the President to reduce oil pollution by tankers by the following means ... "
White House (March 18, 1977).
26. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 340.
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of that piece of equipment can be assumed to prevent this percentage in
the future, if properly used. To the extent that a cause and remedy relationship can be determined for a missing piece of equipment, an assessment of effectiveness is straightforward since costs are easily identifiable.
The estimate of overall cost effectiveness requires only the knowledge
of the number of vessels to be outfitted.
With regard to behavioral causes of accidents such as navigational
errors, the assessment of effectiveness of particular instruments, e.g.,
education and training, is elusive. First, to develop a baseline of the
existing training quality is difficult. Second, establishing a causal relationship between training and navigational error is not convincing due to
the possible intervention of such factors as fatigue. Because of these
difficulties, cost effectiveness studies exist for only four groups of instruments where the behavioral element of individual vessels plays a
minor role:
• navigational equipment of the vessel
* traffic safety measures
* tank size limitations
* increased strength of the hull.
All instruments were analyzed in Coast Guard studies: the first two in
a traffic management study in 1977,27 and the outflow control measures
in preparation for the 1973 MARPOL Conference.28
The Traffic Management Study based its analysis on 78 casualties off
the United States coast between 1972 and 1977, of which 63 involved
tankers. The study estimated the total number of incidents in this period
to be 121, but it limited the analysis to the 78 casualties where information
was available. On the basis of this analysis, 339 accidents were projected
for 1980-1990. As a base of comparison, a complete introduction of the
LORAN-C navigational system was assumed, resulting in a baseline
projection of 271 accidents. The distribution according to the causes of
accidents is shown in the table below:
TABLE

129

Projection of Tanker Accidents off the United States' Coast, 1980-1990
Cause

Status quo

LORAN-C

Grounding
Collision
Ramming

253
70
16

196
65
10

Sum

339

271
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The study surveyed 31 navigational technologies available at the time
for their potential effectiveness and analyzed 18 in detail. The study
grouped the 18 technologies into seven categories, labeled as strategies.
These strategies consisted of:
1) the LORAN-C system as a baseline
2) high level improvement of vessel navigational equipment
35 moderate level of improvement of navigational equipment
4) vessel passport system
5) radar surveillance
6) automatic monitoring
7) satellite system.3"
The LORAN-C system provides a method of improving the accuracy
of location-finding for individual vessels based on coastal stations. The
high level improvement of navigational equipment includes six pieces of
equipment, in addition to those that are required already by international
regulations. They encompass a navigational alert, a collision avoidance
aid, a VHF transponder, a radar perimeter device, a scanning sounder
and a depth alert.
The moderate level consists only of the navigation alert and the VHF
transponder. The Vessel Passport System is a traffic control system for
harbor entrances where vessels are required to report for harbor entrance
24 hours before entering national waters. Access to the harbor is then
allowed on the basis of computerized checks of past vessel history. The
radar surveillance is a traffic control system based on radar stations on
the coast while the automatic monitoring is an enlarged vessel passport
system which provides additional information for incoming vessels with
respect to other traffic. The satellite system is a traffic control system
utilizing transmissions.
Because the various technologies control different causes of accidents,
the study calculated their effectiveness on an individual technology basis,
then combined them for the strategies and assessed them against the
baseline system. The full effectiveness, according to the assumption, will
be fully reached after a five-year introductory period, i.e. in 1985. On
the basis of these assumptions, the costs are calculated and discounted
at 10 percent for the period between 1981 and 1990.
27. United States Coast Guard, Dept. of Transportation, Offshore Vessel Traffic Management
Study, Vol. I-I1 (1978).
28. Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), International Conference on
Maritime Pollution Prevention, Report on Study I, Segregated Ballast Tanks, A Note by the United
States of America, MP/CONF/INF. 2, at 55-86 (May 7, 1973).
29. United States Coast Guard, supra note 27, Vol. II, Ch. 6.
30. Id., Vol II, Ch. 5.
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The comparison of all six additional strategies shows that the vessel
passport system seems to be the most cost-effective. 3 The highest effectiveness is achieved by the automatic monitoring system that reduced the
number of casualties from 271 to 76 at a total cost of $54 million. The
radar surveillance system ranks second with a reduction to 143 accidents
at a cost of $36.2 million, and the passport system with a reduction to
155 accidents ranks third with the extreme low cost of $9.5 million. All
these alternatives compare favorably with the high vessel improvement
strategy with a reduction to 188 accidents at a cost of $319.2 million. A
choice could be made among these alternative strategies either on a cost
effectiveness basis, favoring the passport system, or on a cost-benefit
basis. A cost-benefit calculation in this context is, as already mentioned,
particularly difficult, because oil pollution damages are hard to quantify.
The question remains whether the surveillance and the automatic monitoring are better choices than the passport system. Their effectiveness is
considered higher, but at higher costs. The choice of automatic monitoring, without concomitant higher cost, can be supported if the benefits
of the prevention of one accident would exceed on average the $277
prevention costs per accident. This question can be answered only if the
distribution of damages in all the cases were known, such as damage to
vessel, loss of cargo, and the damage to the environment. If one assumes
that the average accident would cause the loss of 1,000 tons of cargo,
then the benefits would already exceed the costs.
The second study which the Coast Guard prepared for the MARPOL
Conference compares tank size limitations (IMCO Design) with double
bottoms and double sides. Based on the analysis of tanker accidents in
1969-1971, the average outflow per tanker accident was estimated for a
250,000 dwt standard tanker (Tables 2 and 3).
Based on an estimated 365 million dwt tanker fleet for 1980, the average
outflow of product per standard tanker was estimated at 157 m3 . This
total outflow would be reduced if the various alternative vessel designs
were adopted, depending on the particular design and on whether the
design would be required for new construction only, or for the entire
fleet. The Coast Guard then calculated the costs for these designs for a
standard tanker on an annualized basis and developed cost-effectiveness
figures. For the IMCO-Design, the reduction of 1 m3 of outflow would
cost an additional $1,150; for double bottom, additional costs were estimated at $5,940; and for the double bottom and double sides, $14,330.32
The double sides did not result in a reduction in outflow and hence were
excluded from further discussion.
31. See infra Table 2.
32. IMCO, supra note 28, at 36.
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TABLE 333
Outflow Estimates for Different Standard Tanker Designs
Outflow per accident
(m)

Base design
IMCO-Design
Double bottom
Double side
Double bottom and side

Stranding

Collision

6,400
4,950
2,300
12,200
4,200

21,900
17,400
17,600
9,700
12,100

Average Outflow per
tanker per year
(m)

These indicators, however, do not allow a comparison between outflow
reduction and accident prevention measures. The costs are calculated in
a different way, and the references for the effectiveness diverge between
outflow and accident control. To make them comparable, the cost calculations must be made compatible, and the number of accidents translated to outflow figures. The cost calculation for accident prevention
consists of the net present value of the various strategies for 1981-1990.
If one does the same calculation for the various vessel designs, the numbers in Table 4 emerge.
The second step in making the numbers comparable is to convert
numbers of accidents into outflow. The Coast Guard study assumed an
average product outflow of 10,400 m3 or at 300 API 11,900 Ton. A German
study evaluating tanker risks in the North Sea considers a range between
2,100 and 5,600 tons as the most likely outflow. 3 4 A comparison of traffic
safety measures based on the extreme values of outflows (2,100 and
11,900) is seen in Table 5.
TABLE 4
Cost and Effectiveness of Various Tanker-Designs

Design

Outflow
per fleet
m3

Savings in
Outflow
m3

Cost for new
tankers
worldwide
in $ mio.

Cost per m3
outflow
saved in $

Base
IMCO-Design
Double bottom
Double side
Double bottom and side

2,137,000
2,032,000
1,899,000
2,331,900
1,951,000

0
105,200
238,000
- 194,800
185,500

0
118,9
1,408,9
1,752,1
2,422,5

0
1,130
5,920
13,000
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TABLE 5
Cost per t of Oil Outflow Prevented in $

Measure
A. Traffic Safety
high vessel improvement
moderate vessel improvement
vessel passport
radar surveillance
automatic monitoring
satellite system
B. Vessel Design
IMCO
Double bottom
Double bottom and double sides

Average hypothetical
outflow per accident
11,900 t

Average hypothetical
outflow per accident
2,100 t

320
80
7
24
23
200

1,830
460
40
135
132
1,120
990
5,160
5,10

The three systems considered most favorable as a result of the traffic
management study35 are superior in terms of cost effectiveness to outflow
reducing design measures, including the adopted IMCO Design. They
are superior to moderate and high improvement strategies, as well as
vessel design measures under the control of the vessel owner. A similar
set of safety investment strategies would result in the least-cost solution.
Public measures also could be more cost-effective. The reduction of
accidents requires the complimentary provision of a public good-the
management of traffic. The regulation of automobile traffic to reduce
accidents has been taken for granted when the costs of accidents were
analyzed. This might be the right approach when the productivity contribution of traffic regulation at a given level of traffic is exhausted. In
the case of navigational safety, the contribution of a higher level of public
regulation in terms of providing traffic management is more cost effective
than further investment in safety measures on board ship. The level of
safety in air traffic depends to a large extent on the safety of the planes,
but also on the quality of air traffic management which is far above what
the maritime industry has reached so far.
33. Id. at 80.
34. Domier System, Ermittlung von Schwachstellen-Massnahmen zur Vermeidung von Umweltschaden bei industriellen Aktivitaten im Meer, 30-31 (Appendix I)(1979).
35. The concrete result of the vessel traffic management study could be in the self-interest of the
Coast Guard, and they might have influenced the study. Whether such a self-interest bias actually
influenced the outcome of this study cannot be determined by the author of this article, since the
nautical engineering knowledge is lacking. Until there is another study which allows the evaluation
of the basic accident data, one has to take the result of this study as a first approximation of the
possible effectiveness of vessel traffic management schemes.
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CONCLUSION
This article assesses the contribution of liability law to the prevention
of pollution by examining an area where the conditions for successfully
claiming compensation are comparatively favorable for the victim. Difficulties that stand in the way, under traditional tort law, of narrowing
the gap between pollution damages and compensation payments (such as
identity of the polluter, proof of damages and causal relationship) do not
arise in tanker accident cases.
Changes in liability law have improved the legal position of the victims,
but remain insufficient as an incentive for accident prevention. Additionally, optimal pollution control on the basis of liability alone is not possible
because of data asymmetries in the insurance industry. And the assumption
implicit in taxes and licenses, as well as in the liability law approach,
that the polluter is best-qualified to make the best choices to minimize
accident pollution control costs, is disproven by the Coast Guard studies
which indicate that least-cost control technologies for tanker accidents
are outside the purview of individual polluters.
These conclusions indicate that liability can play only a supplementary
role in pollution control. This supplementary role can be enhanced when
compensation laws for pollution problems are discussed again in the
future, if the incentive effects of the financing of compensation receive
more attention than they have in the past.

